



THE CONSIDERATION OF A CONTRACT.
No. 111.
§ 42.-Moral Obligation.-It is stated in the books that'a moral
obligation is a sufficient consideration for an express promise.' This
rule was first enunciated by Lord Mansfield, ' and seems not to have
been called in question till the searching note of Bosanquet and
Puller to the case of Vennallvs., Abney.' It is found in the reporis
of several American States. 4 -This rule, broadly affirmed that
I Watson vs. Turner, Bull. N. P. 147; Atkins vs. Banwell, 2 East, 505; Cooper
vs. Martin, 4 Id. 76; Barnes vs. Hedley, 2 Taunt. 184; Lee vs. Muggeridge, 5 Id.
36 ; Scott vs. Nelson, Esp. Dig. 95; Seago vs. Deane, 4 Bing. 459.' "I hope that
the judges in Westminster Hall will always hold that a moral obligation to pay is a
sufficient consideration for a promise to pay." Per Best, C. J. : Wells vs. Horton,
2 C.*& P. 383.
s Atkins vs. Hill, Cowp. 284; Hawkes vs. Saunders, Id. 290; Trueman vs. Penton,
Id. 544.
'3 B. & P. 249.
4 Salem vs; Andover, 3 Mass. 438; Andover vs. Gould, 6 Id. 43; Davenport vs.
Moore, 15 Id. 94 ; Gleason vs. Dyke, 22 Pick. 390; 1 Swift Dig. (Conn.) 2045 ; 7
Johns. 83; Smith vs. Ware, 13 Id. 382; Doty vs. Wilson, 14 Id. 381; Bentleyvs.
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wherever there is a moral obligation, which no court of law or equity
can enforce, the ties of conscience upon an upright man, and the
honesty and rectitude of the thing are a sufficient consideration for
an express promise to fulfill it,' has been subjected to legal criticism
and abandoned by the courts wherever it has lately come under
consideration, both in England and in this country.3  It did not
appear before the time of Lord Mansfield, it was not required to
sustain the cases decided by him, as they might have teen settled
on narrower legal principles, and an ample consideration existed,
which was rendered inoperative for the time, -by some exceptional
rule of law. If it were true that a moral obligation were competent
to convert an express promise into a legal contract, every promise
must be enforced and the whole doctrine of a consideration dis-
,carded, inasmuch as a promise fairly and deliberately made is
binding on the cohscience. But to enforce the rules, which an
-elevated morality enjoins, does not come within the limited
sovereignty of municipal law.4
Morse, Id. 468; Stewart vs. Eden, 2 Caines, 152; Barlow vs. Smith, 4 Vt. 144;
Glass vs. Beach, 5 Id. 175; Pennington vs. Gittings, 2 G. & J. 217; Greeves vrs.
McAllister, 2 Binney, 591; Ernest vs. Parke, 4 Rawle, 452; 5 Ohio, 56, 1 REke,
.8. 0. Dig. 60.
SAtlus vs. Hill, Cowp. 284; Hawkes vs. Saunders, Id. 290.
2In Littlefield vt. Shee, 2B. & Ad. 811, Lord Tenterden said: "It must be re-*
•ceived -with some limitation." In Jennings vs. Brown, 9 M. & W. 501, Parke Baron
said: "A mere moral obligation which i nothing." In Kaye vs. Dutton, 7 M. & G;
807, Tindall, C. J. said: "A subsequent express promise wil not convert into. a
debt that 'which of itself is not a legal debt." The whole doctrine was overruled in
.an exhaustive judgment in the Queen's Bench, by Lord Denman, C. J. Esatwood
.vs. Kenyon, 11 A. & E. 438, S. 4. 2 P. & D. 276. Said Lord Denman in Beauiont
vs. Reeve, 8 Q. B. 483: "The result is that an express promise cannot be zupported
by a consideration from which the law would not imply a promise, except when the
express promise does. away with a legal suspension or bar of a right of action, which
-but for such suspension or bar would be valid."
Mills vs. Wyman, 8 Pick. 307: Loomis vs. Newhall, 15 Id. 159; -Dodge vs.
Adams, 19 Id. 429; Valentine vs. Foster, 1 Met. 520; Farnham vs. O'Brien, 22
Maine, 475; Warren vs. Whitney, 24, Id. 561; Cook vs. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57;
Edwards vs. Davis, 16 John. 281; Ehie Vs. Judson, 24 Wend. 97; Geer vs. Archer,
2 Barb. 420; Nash vs. Russell, 5 Id. 566; Hatehell vs. Odom, 2 Dev. &Bat. 802.
4 See 3.
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§ 43.-It is, nevertheless true, that many of the cases in which
a moral obligation was said to be a valid consideration for an ex-
press promise were correctly decided. The promise of a debtor to
pay a debt to which the remedy is barred by the statute of limita-
tions or by bankruptcy- 1 of an adult to pay a debt contracted in
infancy not for necessaries;2 of the drawer of a bill of exchange,
or the indorser of a'bill or promissory note to pay the amount, not-
withstanding want of legal notice of non-acceptance or dishonor ;5
of the borrower of money hired on a usurious contract to pay prin-
cipal and lawful interest ;' of a lessor to pay for repairs made by. his
lessee according to parol agreement,5 will be enforced without any
new consideration. It has been once held in 'England 6 and to the
same effect there are dicta in this country 7 that the promise of a
widow to pay for money expended at her request in coverture is
binding. But according to the strong bent of late authorities in
England,8 hnd according to a recent direct decision in New York,
1 Lonsdale vs. Brown, 3 Wash. C. C. 90; S. C. 4 Id. 149. A mere expression of
an intention to pay is not sufficient. Yoxtheimner vs. Keyser, 11 Penn. State, 364.
Or an acknowledgment to a third person not an agent of the creditor 17 Id. 286.
If the promise is conditional, the condition must be fulfilled. Brown vs. Collier, 8
Humph. 510, 32 Maine, 163; Lafarge vs. Jayne, "9 Barr, 510; Tompkins vs. Brown,
1 Denio4 247. Mere statement of a debt in a schedule of banlkuptcy is not suffi-
cient. Christy vs. Flemington, 10 Barr, 129. A note revived by a new romise
does not recover its negotiability. Walbridge vs. Harrow, 18 Vt. 448. See Turner
vs. Chrisman, 20 Ohio, 382; Otis vs. Gazlin, 31 Maine, 567, 32 Id. 163, 181.
21 Str. 690: 2 Kent Comm. 234-239. -
3 Hopes vs. Alden, 6 East, 16 (n);. 2 T. R."713; Story Bills, 320; Story Notes,
362. Contra as to promise of a guarantor to pay a debt discharged by the laches
of the creditor. Van Derveer vs. Wright, 6 Barb. 547.
'Barnes vs. Hedley, 2 Taunt. 184; Kilbourne vs. Bradley, 3 Day, 256, 19 Johns:
147; Jacks vs. Nichols, 5 Barb. 38. But see 1 Campb. 157.
5 Seago vs. Deane, 4 Bing. 459; Farnham vs. O'Brien, 22 Maine, 475. The pro-
mise of a creditor to refund money recovered in a suit after a receipt was found,
which if known at the time of the suit would have prevented recovery, has been
held binding. Bently vs. Morse, 14 Johns. 148.
6Lee vs. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 147.
7Cook vs. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57; Hatchell vs. Adams, 2 Dev. & Bat. 302; Ehle vs.
Judson, 24 Wend. 97; Geer vs. Archer, 2 Barb. 420.
8Littlefield vs. Shee, 2 B. & Ad. 811; Meyer vs. Howorth, 8 A. & E. 467; East-
wood vs. Kenyon, 11 Id. 458. See Lloyd vs. Lee, 1 Str. 94.
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the contracts of a feme covert are absolutely void, and cannot
acquire validity by an express promise to fulfill them after the
disability of coverture is removed.' If the exemption of the party
sought to be charged. has been created by. te a- of the yparties,
as by a release and not by the operation 'of.l4w, the liability of the
debtor will not be restored by his subsequent promise, 'whether the
release was designed for his benefit or for tb t of the creditor.2
Nor will a subsequent promise revive a contraqt which, is void be-
cause of fraud on third partiess or oblige a hirer to pay for services,
the compensation of which has been forfeited according to agree-
ment between the parties by the intoxication of the employee.4
§ 44.-The cases in which a promise S allowed to give validity
to an agreement not otherwise enforceable at law, have been put on
the ground that a moral obligation is a suffi ient consideration where
there has been a pre-existing legal obligation.5- o This rule.Aoes not in-
elude the contracts of infants, on whom no iuch legal obligatilm
rests. 6  Most of them stand on their own footing, and are not sub-
ject to th' strict operation of any one rule. Peihaps they may be
included within the rule, to which exceptions may yet be found to
exist, that wherever there is a contract founded on a su#icent con-
sideration, which would have been enforced but for some positive
exceptional rule of law designed for the protection of the party to
I Watkins vs. Halstead, 2 Sandford, 811; Story Notes, j 185. But it seem that
if goods were furnished her during coverture on faith of her searate estate, her pro-
mise after coverture would be binding. Vance vs. Wells, 8 Ala. 899; Kennerly vs.
Martin, 8 Miss. 698.
2 As a release to qualify a witness, Valentine vs. Foster, I Met. 520; or a dis-
charge by accord and satisfaction, Stafford vs. Bacon, 1 Hill N. Y. 532; S. C. 25
Wend. 384; or a release by creditors on the assignment of the debtor's effects to
trustees, Warren vs. Whitney, 24 Maine, 561. But contra, Willing vs. Peters, 12
S. & R. 177, shaken'by Snevily vs. Reed, 9 Watts, 896. In'Trumbul'vs. Tilton, 1
Foster N. H. 128, it is doubted whether there should be this distinction betweena
discharge by operation of law and discharge by the will of the parties.
3 Cockshott vs. Bennett, 2 T. R. 763 ; Trumbull vs. Tilton, 1 Foster N. H. 128.
4 Monkman vs. ghephardson, 11 A. & E, 411.
5 Wennall vs. Abney, 3 B. & P. 249 note; Mills vs. Wyman, 3 Pick. 307.
6 Farnham vs. O'Brien, 22 Maine, 475; Valentine vs. Foster, 1 Met. 521; Geer vs.
Archer, 2 Barb. 425.
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be charged and unconnected with the element of consideration, that
protection may be waived by an express promise, in some cases at
his pleasure, and in others after the pbriod of disability has passed.'
§ 45.-Executed consideratons.-A considerAtion is said to be
executory when it is to be executed in the future according to the
terms of the contract.2  It is said to be executed, when it consists
of something already done, and, as a general rule, an executed con-
sideration will not support a promise unless it was performed with
the previous request of the promisor.3  Thus, a promise on con-
sideiation that differences had seen submitted to arbitration ;4 that
land had been conveyed;5 that notes had been endorsed ;6 that board
had been furnished ;7 that services had been rendered to secure the
promisor's election to an office,8 is not binding. This doctrine is
well established, notwithstanding Mr. Justice WilmotP said of the
old cases which illustrate it, "that they are strange and absurd,"
and that ' it has been melting down into common sense of' late
times." It is, however, chiefly of importance as a rule of plead-
ing. Such a promise must be declared on as is binding, and if laid
upon a past consideration, for all that appears upon the record, it
may have been a voluntary courtesy.10  The allegation of a request
may be sustained by evidence, which proves that the benefit could
not have been understood between the paities to have been con-
ferred gratuitously; but if so undertood, we presume it wouild not
sustain the subsequent promise of the party who enjoyed it, even
I The rule is well stated in Selwyn N. 1P. 55, 11th ed.
2 A promise to do an act in consideration of some act promised to be done implies
a request. Union Bank vs. Coster, 3 Comst. 211.
3 Hunt vs. Bate, Dyer, 272 (b) ; Hayes vs. Warren, 2 Str. 933 ; Oliverson vs. Wood,
3 Lev. 366; Sydenham vs. Worlington, 1 Godb. 33; Barber vs. Halifax, Cro. Eliz,
741.
'Barlow vs. Smith, 4 Vt. 139.
5 Comstock vs. Smith, 7 Johns. 87.
6 Buckley vs. Landon, 2 Conn. 404; S. C. 3 Id. 76.
7Dodge vs. Adams, 19 Pick. 429.
Dearborne vs. Bowman, 3 Met. 158. As to the guaranty of an existing debt,
see ante, 14. Clark vs. Small, 6 Yerg. 418.
9 Pillaus vs. Mierop, 3 B err. 1671-2.
10 Bac. Abr. Ass. (D), Lampleigh vs. Braithwaite, Hob. 106, 22 Am. Jur. 2-16.
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though conferred at his request.' The allegation of a request has
lately been considered unnecessary, if, from its nature, the benefit
could n'ot havo beech a gratuitous kindness.
2
§ 4.-The reqest necessary to prevent a consideration being
regarded as a voluritary courtesy may be expressed in words or
implied from circumstances. It is implied where one person allows
another to confer a benefit upon him With his knowledge and tacit
assent, having no good reason to suppose it to be conferred as a
gratuity and afterwards availing himself of it.3  A subsequent pro-
mise may, in some cases, be evidence of a previous request. 4  But
the beneficial nature of the consideration, although adopted, will
not, in many instances, as might be inferred.from expressions in
the books' alone sustain the allegation of a request; as where
the course of dealing between the parties. and the circumstances of
the case will not justify the inference that it was done at-the instance
of the party benefitted, and it is of such a nature and so attached
to his property that he cannot reject it.6
§ 47.-There are cases where both the request and the promise
"University vs. McNair, 2 Iredell Ch. 605. Services rendered on request are pre-
sumed not to have been gratuitous; nemopratstimitur donare. Morton vs. Noble, 1
La Ann. 197.
2Fisher vs. Pyne, 1 M. & G. 265, note (b); Victors vs. Davies, 12 M. & W. 758.
3 See Livingston vs. Rogers, 1 Caines, 585 ; Hicks v8. Burnham, 10 Johns. 243;
Oatfield vs. Waring, 14 Id. 19G; Edwards vs. Davis, 16 Id. 281. Weston vs. Davis,
24 Maine, 374: Hatch vs. Purcell, 1 Foster N. H. 247, Yelv. 41, note; Osborne vs. Ro-
gers, 1 Saund. (Williams'), 264, note (1). A father's allowing his child to wear
clothes furnished by a tailor, is an instance of implied request. Law vs. Wilkin, 6
A. & E. 718.
4 See the cases cited in the preceding note.
5 Osborne vs. RPogers, 1 Saund. (Williams'), 264, note (1) ; Livingston vs. Rogers, 1
Caines, 585, Chitty Contr. 62.
6.1s where one voluntarily saves another's goods from destruction', except in cases
of s.alvagc; Bawtbolomew vs. Jackson, 20 Johns. 28; Nicholson vs. Chapman, 2 H.
Bl. 251, Story Bailm. 121 (a); or enters another'sland without authority and makes
improvements. Frcar vs. Hardenbergh, 5 Johns. 272. A purchaser of the public
lands is under no legal obligation to remunerate a squatter for improvements made
on them by him, even although the purchaser has promised to do so. Carson vs.
Clark, 1 Scam. 11' ; Watson vs. Overturf, Id..170; Townsend vs. Briggs, Id.. 472;
RoberEs vs. Garen, Id. 396; McFarland vs. Mathis, 5 English (Ark.), 660.
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are implied, as-where one person is compelled to do that which
another is primarily obligated to do. Thus a surety who has been
compelled to pay the principal's debt, may recover the amount of
him without his prior request or subsequent promise.' In the
original agreement, the principal promised to save his surety harm-
less by an implication of law. But if one person without compul-
sion of law or legal obligation, pays the debt or discharges the legal
obligation of another without his request, the debtor is not liable to
him for the amount paid.2  To render him liable in such a case,
might deprive him of the privilege of set-off against the original
creditor, harass him with suits, and bring him under legal liability
to unreasonable creditors. But such reasons fail when the debtor
promises the party to remunerate him for'what he has done towards
-discharging his obligation, and such a promise is binding.' It is
like the subsequent ratification of the act of a voluntary agent done
without authority, which is equivalent to a previous authority; and
another reason for enforcing such a promise, may be found in the
policy of the law which favors the discharge of the obligations it
imposes.
§ 48.-But although an executed consideration on request will
support an assumpsit, it will sustain no promise, not even an express
one, differing from that which the law would imply; and if the
promisor engages to confer any other or additional benefit, not thus'
implied, he will not be bound unless some new consideration be
I1 Saund. 264; note. - 1 Smith L. C., Lampleigh vs. Braithwaite.
3 Osborne vs. Rogers, 1 Saunders, ('Williams) 264; note.
3 So it has been held recently in Massachusetts, Gleason vs. Dyke, 22 Pick. 390.
Dearborne vs. Bowman, 3 Met. 158. Story Notes, 185. There are dicta to the
same effect in Hatch vs. Purcell, 1 Foster, N. H. 544. Doty vs. Wilson, 14 Johns.
382. Greeves vs. McAllister, 2 Binn. 591. There are English cases decided on the
ground of a moral obligation being a sufficient consideration for an express prIomise
which may be sustained on this principle, as where the overseers of a parish legally
bound to support a pauper, relieved by another, promised to pay for such relief,
theywere held. Watson vs. Turner, Bull. N. P.129, 147, 281. Atkins vs. Barnwell,
2 East, 515. Paynter vs. Williams, 1 Cromp. & Mees. 810. Wing vs. Mll, 1 B. &
Al. 104. See 1 Saunders, (Williams) 264; note .(1). Chitty Cont. 62. Lampleigh
vs. Braithwaite, I Smith L. C. note. Selwyn N. P. (11 ed.) 53; note. Kaye vs.
D'atton, 7 M. & G. 807; contra, 1 Vin. Abr. 279.
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found to sustain it.' Thus it has been held that an executed con-
s'deration whereon the law implies a promise to pay on request, (as
upon an account stated,) is not sufficient to sustain a promise to pay,
at a future day.'
§ 49.-An entire promise, founded partly on an executory and
partly on an executed consideration, is supported by the former s
Thus where a person had furnished board to another's son, for which
the son alone was liable, and continued to furnish it at the father's
request, who promised his security both for the past and future
board, the entire'promise was founded on a valid consideration, not-
withstanding the son boarded with him only a day longer.' Cases
are put of promises founded on an existing liability, which is some-
times called a continuing consideration, as a tenant's promise to
manage a farm in a husband-like manner.' But here the tenant's
promise is void, so far as it extends beyond his existing liability.'
§ 50.-Failed Consideratiofto.-A consideration which was sup-
posed to exist when the contract was made, may turn out not to have
existed, or one which was to be performed, may not have been per-
formed at all, or only partially, or otherwise not according to the con-
tract.7 If the failure is total, the contract founded on such a considera-
tion is a nullity. If it is partial, and the contract is severable, or
founded on two distinct considerations, it may be apportioned to the
1 Granger vs. Collins, 6 M. & W. 458. Jacksoa vs. Cobbin, 8; Id 790. A dec-
laration stating that in consideration, the plaintiff had bought a horse of the de-
fendant at his request, the defendant promised he was free from fault, was not sus-
tained; Roscola v3. Thomas, 8 Q. B. 284.
2 Hopkins vs. Logan, 5 M. & W. 241. The dictum of a judge, profoundly read in
the common law, confines this rule to those cases where a promise is implied by law
from the consideration; per Tindall, C. . Kaye vs. Dutton, 7 M. & G. 807. See
Smith Cont. 112; notes.
3Com. Dig. Ass. B. (12).
4Loomis vs. Nwbhall, 15 Pick. 159. See a similar case Bret. v8. J. S. et ux Cro.
Eliz. 756.
rCotton v. Trescott, 8 Bulst. 187. Powley vs. Walker, 5 T. R. 878.
6 See ante, J 48."
7Hitchcock vs. Giddings,* 4 Price, 185; Allen vs. Hammond, 11 Peters, 68; 2
Kent. Comm. 468. Pothier puts the case of an heir promising to pay the supposed
legacy of his ancestor. 1 Oblig. (Evans) 42.
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extent of the actual consideration.' ,he contract maybe made severa-,
ble in its inception and by its nature, or by subsequent agreement,
express or implied. It may be implied in general where the con-
tract is to furnish labor and materials, aid part performance is ac-
cepted. 2  The vendor of a chattel, who has committed fraud in its
sale, or has not fulfilled his warrantycannot recover the full price
of the vendee, but the fraud or breach of warranty may be pleaded
in abatement of damages, or where no benefit has been received, as
a complete defenbe.3 If the consideration of a promissory note is
entir6 and totally fails, the failure is a valid, defence between the
immediate parties ;4 and, according to the weight of American au-
thorities, a partial failure is a defence pro tanto.5 Partial failure of
title to land, conveyed by deed with warranty, is no defence to an
action on a note or bond for the purchase money, and the grantee
must resort in such cases to the covenants for his remedy.6  But
total failure, according to the weight of American authorities is in
such cases a good defence, neither the covenants nor the temporary
possession with liability to account for mesne profits being a con-
sideration.7 This total failure to be a defence, must be evidenced by
a judicial test as by eviction, or something tantamount thereto A
Parish vs. Stone, 14 Pick. 198.
2 Farnsworth vs. Garrard, 1 Camp. 40, note. Mondel vs. Steel, 8 M. & W. 858;
Hayward vs. -Leonard, 7 Pick. 181 ; Britton vs. Turner, 6 N. H. 481. Sedgwiek on
Damages, Ch. vii., where the conflicting cases are reviewed.
Street vs. Blay, 2 B. & Ad. 456; Poulton vs. Lattimore, 9 B. & C. 659; Beecher
vs. Vrooman, 13 Johns, 802; McAlister vs. Reab, 4 Wend. 483, S. C. 8 Id. 109;
Shepherd vs. Temple, 8 N. H. 455.
4 Still vs. Rood, 15 Johns, 230; Dicklnson vs. Hall, 14 Pick. 217; Parish vs.
Stone, 14 Id. 198; Loring vs. Sumner, 28 Id. 98.
6 Spalding vs. Vandercook, 2 Wend. 431; Batterman vs. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171;
Burton vs. Stewart, 3 Id:-236; Mason vs.- Wait, 4 Scam. 127; Duncan vs. Charles,
Id. 561; Barton vs. Rice, 22 Pick. 508; Paley vs. Balch, 23 Id. 283; Goodwin vs.
Morse, 9 Met. 279; Contra, Thornton vs. Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183; 12 Conn. 234;
Scudder vs. Andrews, 3 McLean, 464, Burton vs. Schermerhorn, 21 'Vt. 89.
6 Greenleaf vs. Cook, 2 Wheat. 13: Smith vs. Sinclair, 15 Mass. 171.
7 Frisbie vs. Hoffnagle, 11 Johns, 50; Knapp vs. Lee, 3 Pick. 452; Rlawle on
Covenants for Title, 491-506; Contra, Lloyd vs. Jewell, 1 Green]. 352; Whitney
vs. Lewis, 21 Wend. 131.
8 Wilson vs. Jordan, 3 Stew. & Per. 92 ; Tallmadge vs. Wallis, 25 Wend. 107.
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§ 51.- pmpossible Considerations.-An impossible consideration
will not sustain a, contract, whether the impossibility results from
natural or municipal law.' If the consideration is only impossible
to be performed by the promisor, but may be performed by others,
it is sufficient, and he must either procure others to perform it, or
give damages for its non-performance.a And a consideration, the
performance of which is only difficult, contingent or improbable,
will support a contract. 3
§ 52.-Gonsideration8 void in part.-If one of two considerations
of a contract be merely void, and not illegal,' it may be rejected
as surplusage and the contract supported by the other.' A pro-
missory note founded on two distinct considerations, one of which
is valid and the other void, may be apportioned, and. the payee be
allowed to recover to the extent of the valid consideration. If an
entire agreement has two considerations, one of which has not been
put in writing in compliance with the statute of frauds, the whole, it
has been held, is void and cannot be apportioned.6
§ 53.-IllegaZ Considerations.&-A consideration partially or
totally illegal will not support a contract.7 Ex turpi -cauea n
oritur actio.8  It is absolutely void, if hostile to the tone, precepts
or purposes of the law. It must not involve the commission of any
act which the common law forbids, or the omission of any act which
it enjoins. 9 It must not contravene the prohibitions of A statute,
whether conveyed in express terms or to be inferred by just impli-
ICo. Litt. 206, (b); Harvey vs. Gibbons, 2 Lev. 161; Nerot vs. Wallace, 8 T. R.
17; Phinney vs. Mann, 1 Rhode Is. 206; 1 Selwyn N. P. 50. Powell on Cont.
161, 164, 179; Paley's Moral & Polit. Philos. Bk. iii. Ch. v. 111.
2 Tufnell vs.Constable, 7 A. & E. 798; Gilpin vs. Consequa, Peters, C. C. 86.
3 Holing vs. Craig, Addison, 343: Yonqua vs. Nixon, Peters, C. C. 224.
4 Chitty Cont. 61, and cases cited.
5 Parish vs. Stone, 14 Pick. 198; Loring vs. Sumner, 23 Id. 98.'
6 Charter vs. Becket, 7 T. R. 201 ; The Lord Lexington vs. Clarke, 2 Vent. 223;
Crawford vs. Morrell, 8 Johns. 253; Loomis vs. Neweall, 15 Pick. 159: This last
case has recentlybeen overruled in Massachusetts in an unreported decision.
7 Collins vs. Blrntern, 2 Mils. 347; Toler vs. Armstrong, 11 Wheat. 258; Deering
vs. Chapman, 22 Maine, 488.-
8 Inst. Lib. 111, Tit. 20, 24, 1 Pothier Oblig. (Evans) 43-46.
9 Boardman vs. Gore, 15 Mass. 331; Brumley vs. Whiting, 5 Pick. 348; Belding
vs. Pitkin, 2 Caines, 147; Whitaker vs. Cone, 2 Johns. Cas. 58.
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cation, as from the infliction of a penalty.' It must not conflict
with the purposes of the law, and tend to defeat justice or corrupt
its administration.2  It must not interfere with a wise public policy,
either imposing improper restraints on trade3 or marriage,4 or
chilling competition at public auctions.5  It must not involve trans-
actions hostile to sound morals 6 and we may add, the Courts ad-
ministering a system of jurisprudence of which Christianity is said
to form a part, may in general, pronounce it a nullity when it
violates her precepts. To these general rules there are some im-
porta'nt modifications or explanations. A promise to indemnify an
illegal act to be done, which is apparently legal is sometimes bind-
ing.7 So a bond or parole promise on good consideration, to in-
demnify an illegal act already done, is not included within the rules
we have stated.8  And a contract between parties who have been
engaged in an illegal enterprise, which would not have been made
,but for such enterprise, but is entirely disconnected from it, is not
void, because of illegal consideration.9  A more minute illustration
of the classes of illegal considerations belongs to the distinct topic
of illegal contracts' 0
Cincinnati, 1854. E. L. P.
1 Featherston vs. Hutchinson, Cro. Eliz. 199; tall vs. Henderson 7 Humph. 199;
Leavitt vs. Palmer, 3 Comet. "19. The distinction betwee mala in se and mala
prohibita in .this respect is now disregarded. U. S. vs. Owens, 2 Peteri, 538;
Greenough vs. Balch, 7 Greenl. 462.
2 4 B1. Comm. 120; Badger vs. Williams, 1 Chip. 137; Meredith vs. Ladd, 2 N.
H. 517; Swan vs. Chandler, 8 B. Munr. 98; Hodson vs. Wilkins, 7 Greenl. 113.
'Mitchell vs. Reynolds, I P. W. 181.
' 1 Story Eq. Juris. 274.
r Phippen vs. Stickney, 3 Met. 384; Gardiner vs. Morse, 25 Maine, 140; Small
Jones, 1 W. & S. 128; Hamilton vs. Hamilton, 2 Rich. Ei. 355;" Brisbane vs..
Adams, 3 Story, 611; Veazie vs. Williams, 3 Id. 611; S. C , Howard, 134.
6 Mitchell vs. Smith, 1 Binn. 120; Forsyth vs. Ohio, 6 Ohio, 24; Fores vs. Rich-
ardson, 4 Esp. 97.
7 Bacon Ab. Ass. E. Allaine vs. Orland, 2 Johns. Cas. 56; Coventry vs. Barton,
17 Johns. 142; 'Avery vs. Halsey, 14 Pick. 174.
8 Williams vs. Lowndes, 1 Hall, 588, 1 Caines, 450; Doty vs. Wilson, 14 Johns.
381, 17 Vt. 244, 11 Mod. 93; 1 Comyn Cont. 30.
9 Toler vs. Armstrong, 4 Wash. C. C. 297; S. C. 11 Wheat. 258; Wooten vs. Miller,
7 S. &M. 380; Howell vs. Fountaiji, 3 Geo. 176.
10 Chitty Cont..657-727.
